The Politics of Labor Unions Laws Policy Making in Argentina by Gonzalez, Marcela Fabiana
ABSTRACT
Title of Thesis: THE POLITICS OF LABOR UNIONS LAWS POLICY             
            MAKING IN ARGENTINA         
            Marcela Fabiana González, Master of Arts, 2004  
Thesis directed by: Associate Professor Meyer Kestnbaum              
               Department of Sociology
The question addressed in the Thesis seek to elucidate 
how and why did organized labor recover its strength vis-à-vis
the state and create for itself a significant political place 
in the process of labor unions laws policy making in the 
eighties in Argentina? Drawing inspiration upon the historical 
institutionalist literature on policy outcomes and Bourdieu’s 
concepts of field and practice sense, we propossed to answer 
the question by placing our attention on the conditional and 
contingent political factors as well as the historical and 
institutional patterns of overlapped and interwoven 
relationships that shaped labor politics: the trilogy state, 
labor, and peronist party. Specifically, we focused on 
organized labor relationally constituted capacities, coherence 
as a collective actor and capacity to fit its demands toward 
the state, the two critical dimensions of labor as a political 
actor to making sense of labor action vis-à-vis the state in 
the politics of labor unions laws reform. 
THE POLITICS OF LABOR UNION LAWS 
POLICY MAKING IN ARGENTINA
by
Marcela Fabiana González
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
the University of Maryland, College Park in partial 




Associate Professor Meyer Kestnbaum, Chair      
Associate Professor Roberto Patricio Korzeniewicz       
Professor Reeve Vanneman





The Journey -Mary Oliver-
One day you finally knew
what you had to do, and began,
though the voices around you
kept shouting their bad advice-
though the whole house
began to tremble




But you did not stop.
You knew what you had to do,
though the wind pried
with its fingers
at the very foundations,
though their melancholy
was terrible.
It was already late
enough, and a wild night,
and the road full of fallen
branches and stones.
But little by little,
as you left their voices behind,
the stars began to burn
through the sheets of clouds,
and there was a new voice
which you slowly
recognized as your own,
iii
that kept you company
as you strode deeper and deeper
into the world,
determined to do
the only thing you could do-
determined to save the only life you could save.
I would like to thank to the members of my committee, 
Meyer Kestnbaum, Patricio Korzeniewicz, and Reeve Vanneman, 
for their generosity and for understanding that the path of 
our calling has many ups and downs. I have a debt of 
gratitude, especially, with two people, who gave me their 
support, effort, and patience under difficult and sad times. 
You have enriched the meaning of the word kindness.
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The last coup d'etat that Argentina witnessed on March 24, 
1976 plunged the country into the ineffable experience of abyss 
and terror. The transition to democracy path, according to the 
literature, was military defeat and regime collapse (O'Donnell, 
Whitehead and Schmitter 1986, Stepan and Linz 1996). It is also 
pointed out that Argentina had "the only unpacted and the most 
classically free transition of the South American cases. This 
in part explains why the incoming democratic government 
imprisoned numerous military officers for human rights 
violations" (Stepan and Linz 1996: pp. 193). Whereas the fact 
that the democratic forces did not pact with the military 
regime the institutional conditions, rules, and content of the 
democratic transition1 was a motive to rejoice, in turn 
contained the promise of a new historical birth. Nonetheless, 
this hopeful and uncertain new beginning did not foster a sort 
of pact among the political parties either, which would have 
established the terms of the democratic transition and certain 
conditions for further institutional and economic design2. 
1Chile, under the aegis of Pinochet, was the conditioned, or "from above", 
democratic transition case par excellence. 
2The most classic example of pacted transitions was Spain, and its 
foundation stone was the Pact of the Moncloa.
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One of the most insightful places in which the full 
implications of the unpacted democratic transition could be 
assesed was the reform of labor unions institutional 
configuration that took place during the first democratic 
government that held in the power to former President Raúl 
Alfonsín (1983-1989)3. Under this period, a new chapter in the 
country labor history was written since the labor unions laws 
had been suppressed under the military dictatorship. The 
discussion between state and organized labor (Confederación 
General del Trabajo, CGT) around the reform of labor unions 
laws became a central component of the political scene until 
1988, five years later, when the new body of labor unions laws 
was finally enacted. 
I aim to tell in this study the fascinating story about 
the uniqueness of the politics of labor unions laws policy 
making and the peculiar historical outcome that emerged in 
which labor succeeded vis-à-vis the state in light of the 
claims pursued and the policy outcomes. The question addressed 
in the study was: How and why did organized labor recover its 
strength vis-à-vis the state as well as create for itself a 
significant political place in the process of labor unions 
laws reform in the eighties in Argentina, in a seemingly 
adverse historical context characterized by labor 
3Between December 1983 and June 1989.
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institutional weakness and a non-pro labor party in the 
government? 
In order to answer the question, we propossed to examine 
the conditional and contingent political factors as well as 
the historical and institutional patterns of overlapped and 
interwoven relationships that shaped labor politics in the 
eighties: the trilogy state, peronist party, and labor. We 
focused on labor calling of 13 general strikes with the aim of 
examining to what extent organized labor through its 
mobilization filled the emptiness place of 'the peronist party 
opposition qua political party', and shaped some of the main 
political arrangements with the state that have had a 
significant impact on the process of policy making and policy 
outcomes. More precisely, the attention was placed on 
organized labor relationally constituted capacities, labor 
coherence as a collective actor and labor capacity to fit its 
demands toward the state, the two critical dimensions of labor 
as a political actor to making sense of labor action vis-à-vis
the state in the politics of labor unions laws reform.
The first chapter has two sections. The first one 
illustrates the theoretical roots upon which this study drew 
inspiration: historical institutionalism on policy outcomes 
and Bourdieu’s concepts of field and practice sense. The 
second section presents the historical and institutional 
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patterns of relationships that shaped labor politics since 
forties in order to illustrate how and why complex and 
overlapped relationships among state, peronist party, and 
trade unions have shaped labor politics in the eighties. The 
second chapter, which analyzes organized labor (CGT) action 
vis-à-vis state action and its impact on the politics of labor 
unions laws policy making, is compossed of three stages: 
corporatist, social, and political party stage. The stages do 
not constitute historically differentiated and irreducible 
stages of the process of labor unions laws reform but rather 
the analytical differentiation in stages had the purpose of 
highlighting in each stage the most relevant features of a 
growing complex, contingent, and overlapped political process.
Let me add a few comments about my theme of study. As the 
grand thinker of the social and political life, Max Weber, has 
taught us long time ago, the selection of our theme of study 
is always a product of its cultural significance and personal 
intellectual values. In my case, I would say that recognized 
and unrecognized intellectual heritages, political passions, 
and my own biography traced the footsteps that led me toward 
the path of this study. The eighties, for my generation of
sociologists in Argentina, was the decade in which our place 
as intellectuals was revealed; we embraced freedom for the 
first time, we became involved in politics for the first time, 
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we were exposed to an immense circulation of ideas and ideals, 
for the first time as well. Maybe this essay represents for me 
a sort of bridge between my present and my past, built with 
certain melancholy because we, those of that moment, are not 
the same, but with the joy to recognize that the time may 
pass, the landscape may change, and we still remain faithful 
to our ideals and dreams.   
Building a bridge between historical
instituionalism and Pierre Bourdieu
This study drew insights upon some remarkable pieces that 
inscribe in the field of historical institutionalist 
literature on policy outcomes (Hall 1986, Skopcol 1985, 
Skopcol 1992). Peter Hall’s work (1986) provided the first 
path to make sense of our historical puzzle. Based on the 
reciprocal influence of institutions, interest, and ideas, 
Hall sustains that historically specific patterns of 
organization (institutions4) have effects on the national 
4By institutions Peter Hall (1986) means "formal rules, compliance 
procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals and in various units of the polity and 
economy. As such, they have more formal status than cultural norms but one 
does not necessarily derive from legal, as opposed to conventional, 
standing. Throughout, the emphasis is on the relational character of 
institutions; that is to say, on the way in which they structure the 
interactions of individuals. In this sense it is the organizational 
qualities of institutions that are being emphasized; and the term 
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policy patterns: “Institutional factors play two fundamental 
roles: on the one hand, the organization of policy making 
affects the degree of power that any set of actors have over 
the policy outcomes. On the other hand, organizational 
position also influences actor's definition of his own 
interests, by establishing his institutional responsibilities 
and relationship to other actors. In this way, organizational 
factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring 
to bear on policy and the likely direction of that pressure 
(...) with an institutional model we can see policy as more 
than the sum of countervailing pressure from social groups. 
That pressure is mediated by an organizational dynamic that 
imprints its own image on the outcome. Because policy making 
in the modern state is always a collective process, the 
configuration of the institutions that aggregate the opinion 
of individual contributors into a set of policies can have its 
own effect on policy outputs”. (pp. 19)  As a complement to 
Peter Hall’s work, and given the centrality of the state in 
the historical scene, Theda Skopcol (1985) provided an 
enlightening path to bring the state back in the analysis of 
policy making, specifically the insightful inquiry about the 
degree of autonomy and the capacities of states as actors 
trying to realize policy goals, “realizing them more or less 
"organization" will be used here as a virtual synonym for "institution" 
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effectively given the available state resources in relation to 
social settings" (pp. 28). In addition, I borrowed insights 
upon her structured polity approach to analyze the origin and 
transformations of national systems of social provision 
(1992), which highlights the reciprocal influence of political 
institutions, social and political factors, political 
opportunities, and policy historical legacy on the politics of 
policy making. 
Following the historical institutional tradition, we 
built a polity-centered analysis of the process of labor 
unions laws policy making in the eighties in Argentina. The 
way in which the politics of labor unions laws policy making 
worked depends upon how trade unions, state, and peronist 
party have been differentially constituted as political actors 
and how relations among them have been variously 
institutionalized. Unlike some corporatist approaches, which 
presumes or asserts not only a particular and exclusive 
pattern of relations between state and labor but also 
reasonable stability in those relations5, our approach 
(pp. 19).
5For example, some corporatist approaches fail to capture not that the state 
truly resides at the center (as corporatism in large measure agree) but that 
the precise manner in which the state resides at the center, and the way in 
which politics works, all depend upon how the state and labor have been 
historically constituted as political actors. Philippe Schmitter (1979) 
defines corporatism as the system of representation of interests in which 
the constitutive units are organized in a limited and not competitive number 
of singular categories. These categories are hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated. They are recognized or authorized (but also 
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specifies the historical and institutional configuration of 
those relations, focuses on multiplicity, overlapping, and 
interwoven relations as well as contingency and change. Thus, 
the politics of labor unions laws policy making was shaped by 
conditional and contingent political factors as well as 
historical and institutional patterns of interwoven and 
overlapped relationships among labor, state, and peronist 
party. In addition, our penchant for building a polity-
centered approach of the process of labor unions laws policy 
making aimed to enhancing the effects of societal institutions 
over policy making and policy outcomes by taking distance from 
some of the materialist and social determinist assumptions 
that often characterize the pluralist6 and neo-marxist7
created) by the state. Each component of this system of representation of 
interest observes certain controls in the selection of its leaders, 
conserves the monopoly of the representation within its respective category, 
and conserves as well the monopoly of the articulation of demands and 
supports. The author differentiates two sub-types: societal corporatism, 
related to the democratic, post-liberal, capitalist welfare state; and state 
corporatism, which is presented as a structural necessity of the anti-
liberal, neo-mercantilist authoritarian state of the under-developed 
capitalism. 
6In the traditional pluralism, the meaning of individual or collective 
action lies in the social norms. The existence of shared norms is a 
condition and guaranty for the constitution of a group to defend it. Indeed, 
the absence of conflict, the stability of political regimes, is explained by 
the integration or internalization of shared norms. Pluralist theory of the 
group of interest also presents democracy as the most legitimate and 
efficient system: democracy is in conditions of processing efficiently 
diverse interests due to the no prevalence of one group upon the other; 
thus, the multiple and no polarized character of the process of policy 
making is guaranteed. 
7Neo-marxism breaks with the pluralist approach. It takes distance from the 
assumption that agents have equal opportunities to organize and to 
influence the process of either political decisions or policy making. 
Conflict and relations of domination are prioritized by this approach. In 
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paradigms (Skopcol 1985, Hall 1986). Likewise, our aim was to 
differentiate our approach from the institutional determinism 
that characterizes the neo-classical pluralist paradigm, whose 
tendency toward linear and static accounts focuses primarily 
on constraints and presents explanations on continuity rather 
change8. The important fact in this context was to 
the structuralist tradition, the problem of collective action is not 
relevant neither in organizative terms nor in the behaviour of the actors. 
This approach sustains Marxism is not interested in individual or 
collective action but in the structural forces that ultimately orient these 
actions. For example, the cyclical crisis theories link increasing levels 
of class confrontation to the end of a long term of cycle accumulation, 
having these cyclical crises a fixed and predetermined length. (Kondratieff 
cycle, a regular economic cycle of fifty years of duration, the so-called 
long wave). However, there is a tradition within neo-marxism that 
emphasizes on the logic of collective action of actors. This tradition 
focuses not only on the inequality in class capacities but also argues that 
capital is in better conditions to shape its own interests. Clauss Offe 
(1987) points out that capital and labor follow different practices of 
association, and also pursue different types of collective action in order 
to favor common interests. Whereas the economic conflict of class implies 
that both organizations pursue one logic of collective action; the 
political conflict of class, on the contrary, implies that each 
organization pursues different logics of collective action. On the one 
hand, capital political logic of collective action will be based on an 
individualist rationality, closer than labor to the pure type of collective 
action the author calls the monological form of collective action. On the 
other hand, labor political type of collective action will express always 
mixed forms of organizations, reproducing an eternal contradiction between 
democracy and bureaucracy, aggregation of individual interests and 
formation of a collective identity. The differentiation in two logics of 
collective action for capital and labor constitutes not only a critique to 
the conceptualization in terms of group of interest because of the 
concealed inequalities inherent to these groups, but also highlights that 
the price paid by labor in organizing and defending its interests is much 
greater than what capitalists pay. 
8The neoclassical pluralism emphasizes the micro-processes as a 
crucial point from which political process or policy making is explained, 
and in order to construct a general theory about individual and collective 
human behavior. The neoclassical pluralism considers that the individuals 
act collectively well informed, and under the consideration of only one 
logic of collective action -- the economic one --. The logic of collective 
action of the actors, then, is centered in rational and individual actors 
whose decisions of collective action are taken in strategic terms respect 
to other parts of the political exchange but not in relational terms. 
Therefore, this approach provides account of single actors rather than the 
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differentiate this study from those approaches that disregard 
variation by taking the historical episode to be analyzed as 
constant. Thus, do not distinguish between the genesis and the 
evolution of a phenomenon, or do not specify which processes 
or events were critical in producing different combinations of 
sequences as well as change (Thelen 1999)9.
As a complement to the historical institutionalist 
literature on policy outcomes, in order to making sense of 
organized labor action vis-à-vis the state, this study was 
greatly influenced also by Pierre Bourdieu (1984, 1994). In 
relations among them. It can explain continuities but not changes and 
variations because the preferences of the actors are stables. Finally it 
takes for granted, and does not even problematize, the symmetric capacity 
of action, power, and influence of the actors over the process of policy 
making. The neo-classical pluralist reaction against the traditional 
pluralism points out that the existence of common interests does not 
guarantee the emergence of collective action; it is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. One of the main disagreements with the traditional 
pluralism arises in the relationship between individual interests and 
collective action. The distinguishing point is that it can not be expected 
that collective actors will necessarily defend common interests. For 
example, Mancur Olson (1982) understands collective action as the sub-
product of strategic actions oriented to the maximization in the individual 
level. In his opinion, the nucleon of the explanation of collective action 
lies in the existence of selective incentives. Thus, rational action and 
selective incentives are the independent variables, and collective action 
the dependent one. The author associates the possibility of collective 
action to the distribution of selective incentives. With the exception of 
small groups, the rational individual will not be interested in cooperating 
to obtain a collective good without coercion or the provision of a 
selective incentive. His thesis, therefore, is that those groups that have 
access to selective incentives will probably act in a collective way to 
obtain collective goods with more frequency than the groups that do not 
have access to these incentives.
9Kathleen Thelen’s work (1999) deserves a special mention because reminds us 
the importance of drawing together insights from the critical junctures 
literature (on institutional formation) and the literature on path 
dependency and policy feedbacks (on institutional reproduction). By 
focusing on the possibilities of institutional openness and change, Thelen 
highlights four sources of institutional dynamism (broad changes in the 
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first place, we drew on Bourdieu’s insights with the aim of 
vanishing from this essay the ghosts and shadows of social 
reification or substantialist modes of thinking. Labor and 
state are not real entities but categories of analysis 
unintelligible in detachment from the historical and symbolical 
relationships within which they act. Echoing Pierre Bourdieu: 
“The substantialist mode of thinking is perhaps most 
unrestrained when it comes to the search for 'explanatory 
factors'. Slipping from the substantive to the substance (to 
paraphrase Wittgenstein), from the constancy of the substantive 
to the constancy of the substance, it treats the properties 
attached to the agents -- occupations, sex, age, qualifications 
-- as forces independent of the relationship within which they 
act”. (Bourdieu 1984: pp. 22) Bourdieu also enabled us to bring 
to the table a way of interpreting organized labor action 
through the lens of relationally constituted capacities, or 
languages of action, which was, in certain way, obscured in the 
historical institutionalist tradition. According to Bourdieu, 
agents’ languages of action express under certain conditions 
contained in the concepts of field and practice sense. Bourdieu 
defines field as a space of forces that imposes over the 
agents, and as a field of struggles within which the agents, 
with differentiated means and goals according to their position 
socioeconomic or political context; changes in the political balance of 
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in the structure of the field of forces, strive to redraw the 
relationships among themselves and, in some cases, their 
conditions of production and reproduction. Yet Bourdieu 
sustains that the agents and their languages of action are not 
subject to mechanically imposed forces or causes. The agents 
are not rational actors acting with full knowledge of their 
actions and consequences. On the contrary, a practice sense, or 
an acquired system of preferences, views of classification and 
division of the social world, durable cognitive structures, 
orient their perception of the situation and their answer. This 
sort of practice sense, what makes the agents to do what they 
consider has to be done in a certain situation, when is 
expressed through the languages of action becomes agents’ 
capacities of establishing symbolic and, eventually, hegemonic 
differences among agents within the boundaries of a specific 
social field (Bourdieu 1984, 1994).
Hence, in this study, in order to making sense of 
organized labor action in the politics of labor unions laws 
policy making, we focused not only on the historical and 
institutional configuration of the relationships that shaped 
labor politics in the eighties but also we examined how and 
what labor capacities shaped labor political interactions, 
political actions, goals, and influenced policy outcomes. In 
power; exogenous changes; institutional breakdowns). 
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doing so, we focused on two organized labor relationally 
constituted capacities: coherence as a collective actor and 
capacity to fit its demands toward the state. By coherence of 
labor as a collective actor, I understand the capacity of 
labor to maintain as a unified collective actor, overcoming 
any eventuality of labor fragmentation although its own 
internal heterogeneity. Labor's capacity to fit its demands 
upon state is defined as the capacity of labor as a collective 
actor to wisely engage in dual relationships toward state, 
which not necessarily expressed different strategies, 
cooperation or confrontation, but, on the contrary, further 
enhanced the capacity of labor to alternately combine, with 
considerable freedom of action, how and when to cooperate or 
confront to state. The two critical dimensions of labor as a 
political actor were not inherent labor capacities or 
resources, or fixed and given labor attributes. They did not 
represent the mere epiphenomenon of the materialist 
substratum, which expressed labor economic interests. They did 
not express labor ideological positions either, understood as 
an idea-system deployed by self-conscious political actors or, 
since a structuralist perspective, constituted by state 
ideological apparatus. But mainly both labor capacities were 
the expression of organized labor practice sense, a sort of 
ethos, or way of being, acting, and belonging within a 
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particular social field, whose meaning is unintelligible in 
detachment from the historical and symbolical patterns of 
relationships within which labor act. 
So that the politics of labor unions laws policy making 
in the eighties in Argentina was shaped by historical and 
institutional patterns of overlapped and interwoven 
relationships among the trilogy state, peronist party, and 
trade unions. Yet it was uncertain and open, and subject to 
conditional and contingent political factors, labor action vis-
à-vis the state. Because, like Brubaker sustains in his fine 
analysis of Yugoslavia or Post-Soviet Union10, the dynamic, path 
that the politics of labor unions laws reform would generate 
was not institutionally determined but relationally constituted 
in the interplay of differentiating languages of action or 
capacities of the agents. By virtue of particular and 
distinctive capacities, coherence as a collective actor and 
capacity to fit its demands toward the state, organized labor 
10In Nationalism Reframed (1996), Rogers Brubaker points out: “The 
relational field in which the national question arises is a highly 
structured one. In the post-Soviet case, it was predictable that 
nationalizing stances of some kind would prevail among successor state 
elites; that successor state Russians would tend to represent themselves 
as a national minority; and that Russian Federation elites would engage in 
"homeland" politics, asserting Russia's right, and obligation, to protect 
the interest of diaspora Russians. In the Yugoslav case, again for 
historical and institutional as well conjunctural reasons, the emergence 
of nationalizing, minority, and homeland stances was similarly 
predictable. But what could not be predicted, and cannot be explained as 
structurally determined, was just what kind of minority self-
understanding, what kind of homeland politics would prevail in the 
struggles among competing stances within these three relational fields, 
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strove to impose differentiating and hegemonic principles upon 
the others players in the field, with the purpose to redefine 
alliances, what kind of unions institutional configuration 
should prevail, and labor social and political representation 
in the politics of labor unions laws policy making. 
What sort of historical and institutional patterns of 
relationships shaped labor politics in the eighties?
There were historical and institutional reasons to 
establish the peronist government in the forties as the point 
of departure to characterize labor politics in the eighties. 
Although some authors have pointed out that, in Argentina,  
labor participation in politics, or the fact that labor 
constitutes the state as the main subject of claims, was not 
inaugurated under peronism -- and I agree with this --, what 
is important in this study is to trace the history of the 
process of structuration of labor politics as a result of the 
historical and institutional patterns of overlapped and 
interwoven relationships among peronist party, state, and 
labor. This particular configuration, precisely, was 
inaugurated in the forties. In addition, the labor unions laws 
and just how the interplay between the three fields would develop". (pp. 
16
that were at the center of the dispute between organized labor 
and state in the eighties have shaped labor institutional 
configuration since peronist government in the forties, and 
were subject to reform in the fifties, sixties, and seventies. 
The laws were subject to reform again in the eighties -- the 
theme of study of this research --, and in the nineties, until 
nowadays. 
Galiani and Gerchunoff (2001) have pointed out that since 
the peronist government that came into power in the forties, a 
pro labor government that clearly counted with the support of 
trade unions, the most favorable legislation for labor unions 
has passed in the forties, fifties, sixties, and during the 
early seventies. Hence, labor institutional configuration has 
constituted a clear source of unions strength and growth. The 
authors mention three institutional sources of unions strength 
and growth. In first place, “the labor unions laws that 
regulated the constitution, organization, and working 
conditions of the trade unions. Although freedom of association 
for workers was guaranteed, the system was based on one union 
by industry: the syndicate that held trade union representation 
got as well civil representation. There was a monopoly of the 
labor representation by unity of categorization -- as being 
part of the same branch of activity, what is, only one trade 
76)
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union was recognized by the state--. These laws also 
established that unions could constitute federations and
confederations, second and third order associations (Decree 
2669, 1943), giving birth to a pyramidal and centralized labor 
organization, with three levels of representation from down to 
top: local level, federation of trade unions by branch of 
activity (public or private), and the CGT, the confederation 
that centralizes all the rest. During the seventies, the law 
was reformed, and the federations and confederation increased 
its capacity to intervene those trade unions that are below in 
the structure of the organization”. (pp. 23)
Another institutional source of unions growth and strength 
is “the professional association’s law, which entitles one 
union to represent a group of workers by industry in a 
determined geographical area in the bargaining process. This is 
the union that obtained legal recognition, which it was 
originally given to the most representative union (law 14455, 
1953). In 1973, the Professional Associations law 20615 
replaced the 14455, although the union model adopted was the 
same. It gave more power and homogeneity to the labor movement. 
Given the union structure prevalent in Argentina, most 
collective agreements are national agreements that take place 
at the industry level. A collective agreement has to be 
endorsed by the ministry of labor and social security has to be 
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extended to all workers and employers of a determinate activity 
in a specific geographical space (collective bargaining law 
14250)”. (pp. 22) Although, according to the authors, “a fairly 
centralized system of collective bargaining like the 
Argentinean promoted labor unions growth by reducing employer 
opposition and by giving unions influence over national 
economic trends” (pp. 10), nonetheless, “a singular 
characteristic of the collective bargaining system in Argentina 
is that it was recurrently eliminated and reinstated by 
military and civil governments respectively. In spite of its 
constitutional guarantee since 1953, there were only a few 
opportunities in which collective bargaining was unfettered. 
Indeed, collective bargaining was banned among 1956 to 1958, 
1967 to 1971, 1973 to 1975, and 1976 to 1988”. (pp. 21)
The third institutional source of unions growth and 
strength mentioned by the authors “is the right granted to 
unions to administrate the national health insurance of the 
workers and families originally developed by collective 
bargaining at the end of fifties. Employers agreed to 
contribute to the funding of the system and the unions imposed 
statutory contributions to their members. During the early 
sixties, the government created by law health insurance systems 
for some industries and some state government employees. 
Finally in 1970, the law 18160 established the creation of a 
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mandatory system for all workers. This system was financed by 
the contribution of both employers and employees irrespective 
whether or not they are union members, and was administrated by 
the union signatory in the collective bargaining of the 
industry. The administration of the system in addition to 
provide unions with substantive financial resources, have 
provided a source to maintain union density at high levels, 
specially in industries where direct control of affiliation by 
the syndicate was too costly, like it is in the case of 
industries with small average of firms (i.e. trade sector)”. 
(pp. 10) 
Without any doubt, labor institutional configuration 
described above has constituted a source of unions growth and 
strength since the peronist government that came into power in 
the forties. However, an exclusive focus on labor institutional 
configuration per se as a way of explaining labor politics does 
not seem enough to elucidate what kind of structuring 
structures have shaped labor politics since the peronist 
government in the forties. One corp of the literature that 
analyzes the process of structuration of labor politics since 
forties until seventies point out that labor politics was 
shaped by historical and institutional patterns of overlapped 
relationships between trade unions and peronist party, which 
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gave to labor unions an exceptional gravitation in the 
Argentinean political, economic, and social life. 
Lipset and Rokkan (1976) have pointed out that cleavages 
in the social structure translate into party systems. The 
Argentinean political system is not an exception to this 
dynamic. The peronist party in particular has been historically 
both an agent of conflict and integration; a space in which 
labor conflicts acquired political expression. This historical 
and institutional pattern of relationships between peronist 
party and organized labor was still present in the eighties, 
even under conditions characterized as emptiness of the 
peronist party opposition qua political party (Mc Guire 1989). 
Many scholars have sustained that the peronist party during 
large part of its history has had the ability to foster a sort 
of political system within the party, with ruling coalitions as 
well as forces that played the role of opposition (Torre 1993). 
This has been the dynamic of the relationship between trade 
unions and party elites, sometimes one emerged vis-à-vis the 
other diminished. It should be highlighted that in several 
opportunities the trade union leaders played a major part in 
party elite's, which bestowed upon them the possibility to act 
simultaneously in two spheres of influence within the party. 
This tendency was much more evident after the coup d'etat of 
1955, period in which trade unions political centrality 
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dramatically increased. The relationship between trade unions 
and peronist party was informally institutionalized in 1957, 
when the peronist trade unions clandestinely got together to 
give birth to the labor side within the peronist party, the 62 
organizaciones peronistas (their main demand was the devolution 
of the CGT building, and the reinstatement of the professional 
associations law enacted under Perón government). (Abós 1983)  
There were historical conditions that contributed to peronism 
capacity to alternatively reinforce either the trade unions 
side or the party side of the peronist party. Between 1955 and 
1983 -- with the exception of the period between 1973-1976 --
the peronist party was not able to participate in elections. 
The regimes alternated between military dictatorships or 
illegitimate democratic governments because of the peronist 
party was proscribed and hence unable to participate in the 
electoral process. Under clandestine conditions, Perón in exile 
(1955-1973), the peronist party proscribed, the trade unions 
constituted the place in which the identification and mutual 
recognition among peronists was maintained alive, in turn the 
peronist party was able to continue acting as a political force 
(James 1990).
On the other hand, a second body of the literature11 that 
analyzes the process of structuration of labor politics since 
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forties highlights that it was, precisely, labor conflict 
politicization what gave to the trade unions an exceptional 
gravitation not only upon the political system, or in 
particular the peronist party, but also upon the state12. Jean 
Bunel (1992) identifies Argentinean labor politics with 
“political corporatism because trade unions are integrated into  
the state not subject to the state. Therefore, political 
corporatism does not abolish labor independence but directs its 
action toward the political field and the state” (pp. 136-137). 
Torre and Sigal (1980) have showed that Argentinean labor 
politics do not fit within the classic attribution of economic 
functions to the trade unions, specially because of its main 
interlocutor is the state, and the sphere of resolution of its 
demands is the political field. The authors point out that 
since the peronist government in 1945 “labor pressures on the 
11I have translated from Spanish the quotations presented in this section. 
12By emphasizing the cleavage between labor and capital as the main 
conflict, even in the political arena, appears as a limitation to understand 
the dynamic between labor and capital in developing countries due to the 
particularity adopted by the process of politicization of the working class. 
It could be argued that in some cases this process did not imply the mere 
translation of the conflict between capital and labor to the political arena 
but it implied the introduction of a third actor, the State, whose 
incorporation redefined both labor and capital capacity of collective 
action, influence, and power (Pizzorno 1973). In any case, the 
politicization of the working class can lead to more stables or short term 
compromises between capital, labor, and state but certainly it can not be 
taken for granted that ultimately it always expresses the conflict between 
capital and labor (Heller 1999). In doing so, the analysis is under danger 
of losing of sight the contradictions within capital, the differences in 
capacity of collective action and organization of the working class, the 
challenges that through its mobilization is in conditions of installing, and 
finally the fact that the state itself often appears to be pursuing a 
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state more than on capital to acquire its demands (...) with 
the exception of some particular trade unions that are 
strategic due to their productive insertion, industrial labor 
had a bargaining power too weak to exclusively orient its 
action at the level of enterprise and in the economic sphere. 
In part as a consequence of this, in part due to the broad role 
of the state, such items us work schedules, holidays, 
professional mobility, as well as the rate of minimum wages 
have been matter of legislative regulation and less an issue to 
negotiate between labor and capital” (pp. 141-142). Juan Carlos 
Portantiero (1987) also highlights the fact that labor politics 
directed its action toward the state, and also points out the 
need to go beyond the analytical distinction between trade 
unions and political party functions in order to characterize 
Argentinean labor politics since forties. According to the 
author, “labor defined its action on behalf of workers, had the 
state as main interlocutor and not capital, and seek to situate 
itself in the political field as a political actor. Its 
function was to coordinate workers interest superseding their 
internal heterogeneity, and its main goal was wage and 
employment (...) Labor has been political by the means of 
strike employed, by the institutions toward whom directed its 
action, and by its ends: centralization and homogeneity of 
strategic logic that is not always consistent with the aim of the capitalist 
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wages, and state recognition of organized labor political and
economic power”. (pp. 167)
The particular characterization of the structuring 
structures that shaped labor politics since forties, as 
described by the two bodies of the literature, was still 
pregnant in our historical puzzle. We will discuss more in 
detail how and why in the next chapter, but broadly speaking, 
in the eighties13, labor politics was shaped by overlapped and 
interwoven patterns of relationships among trade unions, 
peronist party, and state, which was enhanced by two 
historical events that surrounded the Argentinean democratic 
class (Franzosi 1995). 
13The literature that analyzes labor politics in the eighties although is 
not extensive emphasizes also on some issues that are somewhat related to 
the destiny of the labor unions laws in the period. One of the pieces that 
focus on the relationship between labor and government was written by 
Ricardo Gaudio and Andres Thompson (1990). They analyze the period that goes 
from the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) arrival to the government in December 
1983 to the presidential elections in May 1989: "We propose to analyze two 
dimensions of the relationship between government and labor: the 
conjunctures in which social concertation took place, and the political 
logics behind their actions" (pp. 10). With particular attention to detail, 
they analyze the most relevant labor issues in the period: the law of labor 
normalization, the electoral process in trade unions, the project of labor 
relationships modernization, and the incorporation of a labor sector to the 
government. Another work, written by Héctor Palomino (1987), unlike Gaudio 
and Thompson, whose work proposes a historical description of labor 
relationships, Palomino focuses on the strategies that both state and labor 
employed. Some of the main issues that he considers are the projects of 
labor normalization, the Plan Austral, the conflicts by labor sectors, the 
structure of labor market, and the different sectors of labor organization. 
In contrast to these works, Juan Carlos Portantiero (1987) differentiates 
from Palomino and Gaudio and Thompson since the author focuses exclusively 
on the first year and half of government. He aims to reconstruct the diverse 
state proposals of social concertation, and the reasons by which the arrival 
of an agreement was impossible. On the other hand, this work differentiates 
from the prior two because the author conceptually inscribes his historical 
question under the frame of the models of social concertation and political 
pacts implicit both in state corporatism, and the liberal and societal 
neocorporatism.
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transition: the collapse of the military dictatorship and the 
fact that the elections of October 30, 1983 were the first 
opened and free elections in which the peronist party (PJ) 
suffered an electoral defeat since the Unión Cívica Radical 
(UCR) party obtained 50 % of the votes and the PJ 39% of the 
votes. On the one hand, the literature points out that 
Argentina was the democratic transition case “from below” par 
excellence (O'Donnell, Whitehead and Schmitter 1986, Stepan 
and Linz 1996). The military regime collapsed, among other 
factors, due to its own erosion, which enabled the elites of 
the democratic forces to initiate the unpacted process of 
democratic transition. But this unconditionated democratic 
transition had consequences on the design of public policies, 
in particular labor policies, because the democratic forces 
did not pact among them certain conditions for further 
institutional and economic design either. Furthermore, the 
Unión Cívica Radical (UCR) party, which won the elections, did 
not count with a burocratic body of politicians and 
administrators that would design and give certain continuity 
over time to a particular labor policy direction. Hence, state 
capacity and autonomy to realize policy goals (Skopcol 1985, 
1992) was gradually undermined vis-à-vis labor capacity to fit 
its demands toward the state and its coherence as a collective 
actor. On the other hand, the electoral defeat of 1983 plunged 
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the peronist party (PJ) into a deep institutional 
reorganization. It should be remembered that one of the 
factors that carried on to former President Raúl Alfonsín to 
his triumph was the complaint of a pact between the militaries 
and the trade union leaders. This complaint was directly 
associated and impacted deeply on the peronist party because 
the trade union leaders were the party most visible faces at 
that moment. As a consequence of the electoral defeat, the 
peronist party became empty of power, run for elections in 
1985 fractionated, and it was just at the end of 1985, 
afterwards the mid-term elections, when a new sector emerged 
within the party -- called Peronist Renovation --. This sector 
began gradually to win spaces of power, in turn displaced the 
trade union leaders from positions of authority within the 
party, until the peronist party primaries in 1988 to select 
the presidential formula for the elections of 1989. (Gutiérrez 
2001, Lewitsky 1999). Since the PJ was immersed in a deep 
process of democratization and institutional reorganization 
almost since the beginning of the democratic government, the 
peronist party qua political party enabled the UCR to dialogue 
less with the party of opposition but its ephemeral fragments. 
In this stage, the UCR was surrounded by a historical and 
(lethal) paradox: the emptiness place of the peronist party 
opposition qua political party and the trade union leaders as 
27
the only trustworthy peronist party visible face. Before this 
dilemma, the UCR did of need virtue, and the trade unions were 
considered the peronist political interlocutor for the 
government. The political actor with whom to cooperate, to 
confront, and eventually to incorporate as part of the ruling 
coalition (in 1987, Alderete, a trade unions leader, was 
appointed Minister of Labor). 
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Chapter 2
Labor action vis-à-vis the state 
in the politics of labor unions laws policy making
During the military dictatorship (1976-1983), the labor 
unions laws that shaped labor unions institutional 
configuration since forties were supressed, and as a result, 
labor unions sources of strenght and growth. As Galiani and 
Gerchunoff (2001) pointed out, during the military regime, 
“the government faculties to intervene trade unions expanded, 
being banned the trade unions' activities, elections and 
assemblies. The Labor General Confederation (CGT), the 
regional labor representations (3rd order associations) and 
the second order trade unions were intervened. It was 
established, as well, that the CGT would not intervene in the 
conduction and in the administration of the labor system of 
health insurance. Indeed, enterprise's contributions through 
collective agreements were suspended. Additionally, it was 
derogated the decree 1045 (1974), which allowed unions to 
charge fees to all workers in the industry irrespective of 
whether or not they were union members. As a result, the main 
fountain of resources of the trade unions became circumscribed 
to member's dues and contributions. The law 21261 suspended 
the right to strike and also suspended collective bargaining. 
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The government established wages since then, until the 
reinstatement bargaining in 1988”. (pp. 24) The labor unions 
laws that were at the heart of the dispute between state and 
organized labor during the first democratic government (1983-
1989) were the law that organizes the trade unions 
professional associations, the law that grants to trade unions 
the right to administrate the Health Insurance National System 
for workers and families, and the law that regulates the 
system of wage bargaining including minimum wage.
The question addressed in the Thesis aimed to elucidate 
how and why did organized labor create for itself a 
significant political place in the politics of labor unions 
laws policy making in the eighties, in a seemingly adverse 
historical context characterized by labor institutional 
weakness and a non-pro labor political party in the 
government? In order to answer the question, we placed our 
attention on the the conditional and contingent political 
factors as well as the historical and institutional patterns 
of overlapped relationships that shaped labor politics in the 
eighties: the trilogy labor, peronist party, and state. We 
focused on labor calling of 13 general strikes14 with the aim 
14 We draw inspiration upon Tilly and Shorter pioneer work about the strikes 
in France (1974). This work understands labor collective action through 
the hypothesis of political action, as part of a struggle that takes place 
in the political field. In this sense, the state appears as the main 
object of claim. The strikes, for the authors, are less a demonstration of 
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of examining to what extent labor through its mobilization 
filled the emptiness place of 'the peronist party opposition 
qua political party', and shaped some of the main political 
arrangements with the state that have had a significant impact 
on the process of policy making and policy outcomes.
     More important here than the processes of instrumental 
action in which organized labor was engaged in its quest for 
the accomplishment of its agenda, more important than the 
instrumental rationality behind the misse in scene of these 
general strikes, was what field of struggles and what 
symbolically mediated relationships within which labor act 
economic force than a manifestation of labor symbolic power and political 
decision, oriented toward the political authorities. One note in regard to 
Tilly's work. Although I am considering a piece written in the seventies, 
and since then, he has introduced new concepts to analyze mobilization, I 
believe that, for the ends of my research, the piece about the strikes in 
France brings to the table an appropriate answer to my interest, and on 
the other hand, it is also present, and has even become an assumption, on 
Tilly's oeuvre. I am referring, in particular, to the way in which 
contentious politics is understood, with the presence of the state or 
authorities as at least one of the parts of the struggle. 
A new concept introduced later by Tilly in his works was the concept 
of repertoires of collective action, From Mobilization to Revolution
(1978), Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834 (1995). In the 
latter, Tilly makes a comparison of British struggles between 1758 and 
1833, and shows how the predominantly forms of popular collective action 
changed during 75 years. The author discusses with the historical 
literature by the fact that this literature presents documentation that 
analyzes particular forms of contentious but there is not a systematic 
discussion of their covariation and change. In this text, Tilly pointed 
out that the definition of repertoires of collective action presented 
differs from his prior definition in From Mobilization to Revolution
(1978) because that definition was prisoner of a teleological tone, and 
its categories, competitive, reactive, and proactive categories, sound 
like modernization theory. In his new definition he tries to expound the 
residues of modernization theory from the concept. His first definition of 
repertoires also assumed that a single actor (individual or collective) 
owned a repertoire of means and deployed it strategically. For Tilly, that
was also a mistake because repertoires of collective action designate not 
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shaped these strikes misse in sense. Thus, labor action 
through the calling of thirteen general strikes was taken as a 
place in which the alliances among agents (organized labor and 
state, but also industrial organizations, political parties, 
labor sectors) and organized labor relationally constituted 
capacities (labor coherence as a collective actor and labor 
capacity to fit its demands toward the state) could be re-
constructed. Labor coherence as a collective actor touts its 
capacity to overcome any eventuality of labor fragmentation 
despite of its own internal heterogeneity.  Labor's capacity 
as a collective actor to fit its demands upon state enhances 
its capacity to engage in dual relationships toward the state 
by combining, in an alternate way and with considerable 
freedom of action, how and when to cooperate or confront to 
state. Both crucial dimensions of labor as a political actor, 
or labor capacities, were, precisely, what made Argentinean 
labor politics unique in the eighties. Cooperation and 
confrontation toward state were both present under the same 
historical period and with a strong and unified organized 
labor15. On the other hand, cooperation (and confrontation) was 
individual performances but means of interaction among pairs of larger 
sets of actors.
15Labor politics in Argentina has been also characterized in terms of 
cooperation or confrontation before the eighties. For example, Samuel 
Valenzuela (1985) points out that Argentinean labor politics, in different 
historical periods, have fluctuated from a "state labor" to an "antagonist 
labor". Torcuato Di Tella (1969) sustains that labor situated in a 
continuum that went from a "proto-state labor" to "autonomous mass labor", 
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present as mechanisms linking labor and state in a historical 
context in which the political party in the government was not 
the peronist party, the historically oriented pro-labor party, 
but the UCR (Unión Cívica Radical).
During the first democratic government, inasmuch labor 
capacity to fit its demands toward the state and labor 
capacity to maintain its coherence as a collective actor 
varied and changed over time, state, peronist party, and trade 
unions alliances did not remain unchangeable either, which 
gave birth to three differentiated and distinctive stages in 
the process of labor unions laws policy making. The stages do 
not constitute historically differentiated and irreducible 
stages but rather the analytical differentiation in stages had 
the purpose of highlighting in each stage the most relevant 
features of a growing complex, contingent, and overlapped 
political process. 
(1) Corporatist stage: since the beginning of the first 
democratic government (December 1983) until the 
(economic) Plan Austral (1985).
at half a way between pragmatic reformism and ideological reformism, 
considering as well different historical periods. However, the main 
difference we found in labor politics in the eighties was the fact that 
cooperation and confrontation was both present as mechanisms linking labor 
and state under the same historical period and with a strong and unified 
labor organization in spite of its internal heterogeneity. 
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(2) Social stage: since the Plan Austral until Alderete, a 
trade union leader, was appointed Minister of Labor 
(April 1987). 
(3) Political party stage: since the mid-term elections in 
which the peronist party acquired an overwhelming victory 
over the UCR (September 1987) until the end of 1988 
(after the peronist party primaries in which the formula 
Menem/Duhalde was elected to run for the next 
presidential elections in 1989).
Corporatist stage
Since the beginning of the democratic government 
(December 10, 1983) until the economic Plan Austral (in 1985), 
organized labor (CGT) called on two general strikes: on 
September 3, 1984 and on May 23, 1985. The first stage was 
characterized corporatist because during this period: (1) The 
political party in the government, UCR, politically confronted 
to the social corporations (organized labor, industrial 
organizations, and also militaries); (2) The CGT and the 
industrial organizations became closer and even arrived in 
many opportunities to agreements as an answer to state labor 
policies; as further support, some industrial organizations 
expressed their explicit support to the CGT in both general 
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strikes; (3) State proposals of labor policies failed; (4) 
Labor sectors joined together under one organized labor (CGT).    
I will briefly characterize the labor sectors that have 
had a relevant political presence within organized labor (CGT) 
in the eighties: "62", "25", "ubaldinismo", and “15”. Since 
1983, different labor sectors began to take form within the 
CGT, showing these labor sectors discontinuity and not always 
agreement on what kind of relationships the CGT should 
establish vis-à-vis the state. Organized labor had internal 
contradictions and limitations regarding to whether or not to 
confront or cooperate with the state, and with regards to what 
kind of labor alliances to maintain. This internal 
heterogeneity was expressed many times in the general strikes, 
and in the way in which these sectors related toward the 
state. However, these differences never became such 
irreconcilables to fragment labor organization.
"62": This sector was created in 1956, when 62 peronist 
trade unions clandestinely got together, after the peronist 
government overthrow by the coup d'etat of 1955. The "62" 
transformed in the peronist sector within the trade unions, 
and maintained its hegemony within organized labor over time 
with the exception of those historical periods in which an 
alternative labor organization was created. Being trade unions 
political arm, this group expressed the traditional peronist 
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features within the trade unions: organized labor was 
centralized and verticalist, and established a direct 
relationship with the state to whom recognized as its main 
interlocutor. Participated in this sector, among other trade 
unions: UOM (metal workers), UOCRA (construction), Carne (meat 
industry), and Comercio (trade sector).
"25": Labor peronist renovation, or "25", was created 
under the military dictatorship (1976-1983), when a group of 
trade unions called on the first general strike (April 1979). 
They expressed a more antagonist relationship toward the state 
than the “62”, promoting the calling of strikes and labor 
mobilizations. The discussion with the state was not only 
centered on wage issues but also social policies (health, 
education, housing, etc). One feature that defined this group 
was its closeness with the Peronist Renovation, a sector 
within the peronist party that in the eighties initiated the 
process of peronist institutional reorganization and 
democratization, after the electoral defeat of 1983. Thus, the 
"25" intended to introduce democratizing practices within 
organized labor. In this group converged trade unions leaders 
from the "62", as well as some trade unions that in the late 
sixties had created an alternative labor organization to the 
official CGT, the CGT of the Argentineans. Among others trade 
unions, the most important were: Taxistas (taxi drivers), 
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Tabaco (tobacco), Camioneros (truck drivers), and SMATA (metal 
workers supervisors).       
"Ubaldinismo": This group represented a younger 
generation of trade union leaders than Lorenzo Miguel and the 
"62". Ubaldini's leadership was consolidated under the first 
democratic government. Expressed certain tone of social 
protest that in such a way contributed to organized labor 
coherence. Labor sector differences metamorphosed under the 
protection of this group, which summoned the support from the 
"62" and the "25". The main trade unions, in its majority from 
the public sector, were: UPCN (state employees), public 
services state trade unions, such us Luz y Fuerza 
(electricity) and Obras Sanitarias (water).
"15": Although this labor sector was created in 1987, 
different trade unions gradually converged in the same labor 
space, which represented the trade unions that had always 
established differentiating relationships with the state 
(generally reserved) in comparison with the strategy followed 
by the CGT. These trade unions expressed different labor 
traditions: from "Gestión y Trabajo", a labor sector that 
followed collaborator practices during the military 
dictatorship (Comercio (trade sector) and Plásticos (plastic 
industry)), from the "62" and from the "25" (FOETRA 
(telephone) and SMATA (metal workers supervisors).
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The first project to reform the labor unions law that 
shaped organized labor institutional configuration was the 
Labor Reorganization Law proposal, presented before the 
Congress by the Executive Power eight days later of having 
arrived the former president Alfonsín to the presidency. The 
project of labor unions institutional configuration reform was 
known as the Mucci Law, because, precisely, Mucci was the 
Minister of Labor. Although it was approved in the Chamber of 
Representatives in the Congress, the law was not enacted 
because the UCR lost the final voting in the Senate (for only 
one vote of difference). The immediate effect that this state 
labor proposal provoked among labor sectors was organized 
labor (CGT) unification, which was divided in two 
organizations since the military regime: CGT Brazil and CGT 
Azopardo. The failed state proposal of labor unions 
institutional configuration reform not only provoked, as an 
immediate answer, organized labor unification, but also 
created the conditions for trade unions and industrial 
organizations closeness. For example, in the CGT Press 
Release, dated on March 20, 1984, the CGT expressed the 
calling to the industrial organizations with the aim to carry 
out multisectorial meetings to analyze the socio-economic 
crisis. The history could have been very different, or perhaps 
not, if the Mucci Law instead of loosing in the Senate for 
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only one vote would have been enacted. The fact is that three 
months later of having arrived the UCR to the government, the 
conflict between organized labor and state around the destiny 
of the labor unions laws showed its first face, and both 
actors did not hesitate to choose the path that leads them 
toward confrontation.
One of the consequences of this project of labor unions 
institutional configuration reform failure for the UCR was the 
change of the Minister of Labor. Casella replaced to Mucci, 
and under his administration it was inaugurated a new style of 
communication between the state and the CGT. Indeed, Casella 
represented the sector within the state that favored 
agreements with the CGT, contrary to other members who had 
much more intransigent positions, like the General Secretary 
of the Presidency, G. López, or the president of the 
Commission of Labor in the Congress, O. Sanmartino. The new 
Minister of Labor, Casella, had as main goals to reach a 
consensus with the CGT on the terms of organized labor 
electoral process, the law of unions professional 
associations, and the law that regulates the trade unions 
administration of the labor health insurance system. During 
Casella administration in the Ministry of Labor, the CGT 
obtained two of its main goals. In first place, the articles 
that prohibited to the trade unions the management of the 
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labor health insurance system, since the military regime, were 
suspended for a period of six months by the Senate. In second 
place, the Senate converted in law the trade unions electoral 
code approved by the CGT and the Minister of Labor. This last 
point was very important for the CGT because the trade unions 
had to call for elections since, at the end of the military 
regime, representatives from the Ministry of Labor had been 
appointed in those trade unions intervened after the coup 
d'etat of 1976. Although some trade unions had already called 
for elections, it was done under the law 22105 promulgated in 
1979 by the General Videla. 
The CGT introduced also a new item in the negotiations 
with the state, which was organized labor participation in the 
design of wage policies. The former president Alfonsín 
declared in March that the CGT, industrial organizations, and 
state would participate in ad hoc organisms, with the purpose 
of discussing the design of the wage and price policies, until 
the creation of the Minimum Wage National Council. The first 
formal meeting for the socio-economic concertation proposed by 
the state, and that organized labor attended, was held in 
August 1984. The other two meetings did not have the same lot 
because the CGT and the national assembly of regional trade 
unions resolved to call on the first general strike for 
September 3, 1984. Apparently the general strike was called 
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because of the state rejection of incorporating in the August 
wage increase of some wage additional, such us productivity 
awards, antiquity, etc. However, there were other underlying 
motivations that made the CGT to generate a political action 
such a general strike: the closeness of the electoral process 
in the trade unions, and the pressure on the CGT from those 
trade unions established in the interior of the country. 
At the end of August, there was a new replacement in the 
Ministry of Labor. Although the first general strike cannot be 
considered the main cause for the departure of Casella from 
the Ministry of Labor, the truth is that the internal tensions 
and differences within the state with regards to what kind of 
labor policy direction to follow came to the forefront again, 
and the sectors that had lost spaces of influence after the 
defeat of the Labor Reorganization proposal (or Mucci project) 
confronted not only to the CGT but mainly to the Minister of 
Labor, Casella, and his conciliatory labor policies. The 
former president Raúl Alfonsín appointed as Ministry of Labor 
to Barrionuevo. The new minister was a man of the trade unions 
(from the labor sector called "20", former CGT Azopardo, and a 
sector that after having opposed to the CGT unification in 
1984 participated out of the structure of the CGT). The 
effects of his appointment in the CGT were divided: the sector 
called "25" and the "62" expressed their conformity; but the 
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sector "Gestión y Trabajo" expressed its disapproval. The new 
administration intended to continue with the state proposal of 
a formal socio-economic concertation among trade unions, 
state, and industrial organizations. The new ministry 
inaugurated his functions with a new decree that established 
the wage increase for October, November, and December. At 
first sight, this was one of the major obstacles that 
Barrionuevo had to face; however, curiously, this decree did 
not have major resonance within the CGT since organized labor 
was absorbed in the trade unions electoral process. 
The informal contacts between the CGT and the Minister of 
Labor Barrionuevo were interrupted in December when the CGT 
claimed for a new wage adjustment before the end of the year, 
in turn expressed its concern for the project of Health 
National System that was circulating in different spheres of 
the state. The Minister of Social Action intended to create a 
Health National System, and his intention was to send the 
project to the Congress in February. Deepening the gap that 
separated the CGT from the state, it was announced the 
proposal to create an unemployment system. As answer to both 
projects, the CGT distributed a new document with eight points 
in which conditioned its return to the socio-economic 
concertation with the state and the industrial organizations. 
In this document, the CGT avoided to criticize to the former 
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president Alfonsín, and directed its tough critics against the 
Minister of Economy, the Minister of Labor, and the Minister 
of Social Action. The document criticized directly the state 
wage policies because did not seem to have any difference with 
the military regime wage policies, and conditioned labor 
return to the socio-economic concertation upon the 
establishment of wage policies not based on the IMF 
directives, but upon the reinstatement of collective 
bargaining. Thus, at the end of 1984, the CGT made his first 
public announcement in defence of the reinstatement of the law 
of collective bargaining. 
The meetings for the socio-economic concertation between 
trade unions and state were reinitiated after that the former 
president Alfonsín announced that collective bargaining would 
be reinstated not so far than July 1985. Even more, the CGT 
demonstrated its willingness to cooperate with the state and 
did not immediately pronounce with regards to the Plan 
Quinquenal proposed by the Secretary of Planification, and 
avoided any references to the “Plan for Social Concertation” 
presented in the presidential residence in Olivos. The state 
proposal was the following: the concertation would have two 
parts: first, the Plan Quinquenal proposed by Sorrouille, and 
in a second step, the Social and Economic Pact to be signed by 
the state, the CGT, and industrial organizations. The proposal 
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included the commitment to reduce fiscal deficit to 6 % of 
GNP; to increase tax collections; payment on time of public 
job. In addition, it was offered to the CGT and the industrial 
organizations the establishment of mechanisms of inflation 
self-control, the transformation of the system of control of 
prices in control of costs, the inclusion of productivity 
agreements in collective bargaining, the adjustment of the 
real wage to the levels acquired in 1984, and the adjustment 
of wage increase to the GNP. 
Under these circumstances, it was agreed a truce of 
thirty days, in which the industrial organizations committed 
to avoid job suspensions and dismissals, and the CGT committed 
not to call on general strikes. Parallel to this truce, the 
CGT and ten industrial organizations joined together in the 
group called "11", which elaborated a Proposal of Concertation 
as counter-point to the state proposal. One more time, as we 
sustained in the outset of this section, the answer to state 
labor policies proposals had as consequence the closeness and 
agreement between industrial organizations and trade unions. 
Two documents were elaborated: "Proposal of Social Pact" and 
"Proposal of Growth with Freedom and Social Justice". More 
than the proposal of a social pact, the documents presented a 
collection of demands by sector, and many of them were 
anything but contradictory between each other. For example, 
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"to increase the rate of exchange for exports, and to reduce 
fiscal deficit" would affect real wage increase, as well as 
"to diminish taxes for industry, and to grant loans for 
industry" implied to control state capacity to redistribute 
resources, in turn to diminish workers and farming-exporting 
sector participation in national income distribution. One of 
the most important points of the document was related to the 
management of the labor health insurance system. The document 
proposed that the trade unions should be in charge of the 
management of the health insurance system for workers and 
their families, what was an explicit answer to the state 
proposal to create a National System of Health Insurance. 
At the end of February, a new event would radically 
modify the relationships between the state and organized 
labor, which would establish the foundations for the next 
stage. The Minister of Economy, B. Grinspun, resigned and 
Alfonsín appointed in his place to J. Sorrouille, who was at 
that moment in the Secretary of Planification, and had 
elaborated the last state proposal of social concertation. The 
seriousness of the economic situation was expressed by the 
president when in a public act on April 27, 1985 announced the 
implementation of an "economy of war". During these months the 
confrontation between the CGT and the state intensified. The 
CGT elaborated a plan of strikes and called on to a new 
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general strike with mobilization for May 23, 1985. The main 
demands were the defence of job stability, wage increase, 
defence of national industry, and the devolution of the labor 
health insurance system administration to the trade unions. In 
the middle of a terrible inflationary situation (in on year 
the rate was around 1580 %) it was announced the 
implementation of a new economic plan, the Plan Austral, which 
radically changed state economic policies as it had been 
applied until that moment as well as recognized the inevitable 
exhaustion of this phase.
During the first year, it was clear the state 
difficulties to realize labor policy goals. On the one hand, 
it was clear the state lack of capacity to arrive into an 
agreement for socio-economic concertation (for example, in 
wage policies or in the establishment of collective 
bargaining) (Portantiero 1987). On the other hand, it was 
evident the lack of capacity from the state standpoint to 
maintain certain continuity in labor policies direction due 
to, as we have showed, state internal contradictions on which 
labor institutional configuration should prevail and on which 
labor allies to find (for example, in the case of the first 
state proposal to modify the law that regulates the 
instituional configuration of organized labor (Mucci Law), or 
the modifications proposed to the labor health insurance 
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system through the creation of a Health National System). As a 
consequence, from the CGT standpoint, not only resisted these 
state proposals by confronting to the state but also the 
agreements on these issues with industrial organizations were 
intensified. And mainly, organized labor, CGT, was unified, 
initiating a long phase that will last until the end of this 
presidential period, in which organized labor (CGT) will 
privilege its coherence as collective actor although its 
visible heterogeneity.   
Social stage
Since the economic Plan Austral (1985) until Alderete, a 
trade union leader, was appointed in the Ministry of Labor 
(April 1987) organized labor called on six general strikes: 
August 29, 1985; January 24, 1986; March 25, 1986; June 13, 
1986; October 9, 1986; and January 26, 1987. The second stage 
was characterized social by taking into account: (1) General 
strikes main goals; (2) The relationship between the general 
strikes and the evolution of the number of strikes by economic 
sector; (3) Organized labor dual relationship toward the 
state, cooperation and confrontation, exacerbated, since 
organized labor confronted the state through the calling of 
six general strikes, while labor cooperation toward the state 
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was crystallized in labor forming part of the ruling 
coalition; (4) The internal differences within organized labor 
(CGT) became more visible, and the general strikes were 
visualized by the labor unions sectors as a place of 
construction of power. 
Political goals criticizing the socio-economic policies 
were still part of the CGT claims in these general strikes. 
However, social claims acquired a particular significance in 
this stage, mainly those social claims connected to labor 
institutional configuration as well as wage policies and the 
defence of job positions. The general strikes claims in this 
phase picked up the claims in the strikes by sector of 
economy. Taking into account the work of Héctor Palomino in 
the Journal El Bimestre (1984-1988), since the end of May 
through August 1985, the number of strikes by sectors of 
economy decreased. In these months, the evolution of labor 
conflicts followed the descendent tendency of industrial 
activity. Palomino points out that the number of conflicts 
decreased because the economic recession threatened job 
stability. Since in the previous months and after the economic 
Plan Austral the economic recession became deepest, the main 
claims addressed in the strikes were related to dismissals and 
job suspensions. After August 1985, the tendency in the nature 
of the claims raised in the strikes by sector of economy was 
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reversed. The improvement in the labor market situation --
maybe because there was an improvement in the industrial 
activity, maybe because the increase of unemployment temporary 
stopped – enabled the claims on wage increase to replace the 
claims on dismissals and job suspensions of the prior semester 
of the year. 
During 1986, the number of labor strikes by sector of 
economy showed a growing expansion until June, when they 
stabilized in a pretty high level, to descend again in 
November. Until June, at the same time that the signs of 
economic reactivation were more evident, the strikes were 
disseminated all over the sectors of economic activity --
public and private --. The strikes in both sectors, public and 
private, had a common denominator: wage claims. The strikes 
not only claimed for wage increase but also the recognition as 
part of the real wage of some of the wage additional, such us 
productivity awards, bonus, etc. In the public sector, the 
number of conflicts reproduced not only because of low wages 
but also due to the wage increase in the private sector. After 
July, the evolution of the number of strikes by sector of 
economy was modified because the state promoted wage 
bargaining between organized labor and industrial 
organizations, and also wage bargaining was promoted within 
the state. In July 1985, the big industrial trade unions, 
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beginning by the UOM (metal workers), agreed on with the 
industrial organizations a serie of wage increase, which 
constituted a sort of essay of collective bargaining under 
state supervision. Thus, in the second semester of the year, 
the greatest number of strikes were called by state labor 
unions since in the private sector there was a predisposition 
to negotiate wages under the rules established by the state 
(the system established a minimum and maximum percent of wage 
increase in order to prevent the policy of prices stability 
from being affected). In 1987, since the descendent tendency 
in the number of strikes continued, the lowest number of 
strikes was registered. 
The brief summary of the evolution in the number of 
strikes during this stage intended to show the correspondence 
between the evolution of the number of conflicts and the 
economic situation. The economic Plan Austral provoked the 
stability of unemployment rate, and sub-employment rate did 
not show the stability of the former but remained constant. 
Under conditions in which the economic situation improved, the 
number of strikes increased, and also the nature of the claims 
changed (from job stability to wage increase). This 
relationship between economic situation and general strikes 
did not exist. The number of general strikes was the same in 
uneven economic conditions. However, there was a certain 
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correspondence between the claims raised in the strikes by 
economic sector and the claims raised in the general strikes. 
As it happened with the nature of the claims raised by 
economic sector, in the general strikes called on before the 
Plan Austral, the main claim of the CGT was the defence of job 
stability and the opposition to job suspensions and 
dismissals, whereas after the Plan Austral, the claims turned 
to wage claims. 
The nature of the general strikes wage claims deserves an 
special explanation. Because under this period, if we compare 
the evolution of the real wage with the evolution of the wage 
according to cost of living adjustment, we find a recuperation 
of the real wage compared to the levels acquired before the
Plan Austral. It does not near the rates of 1984, although the 
rates are higher than the rates that the real wage will have 
later, overall in the last part of the government. The wage 
according to cost of living adjustment improved also because 
the inflation was controlled under the Plan Austral, reducing 
the gap between both wages. What I am trying to highlight is 
that, in the general strikes, at the heart of the divergence 
between the CGT and the state with regards to wage claims, 
there was a wage dimension that the state was not in 
conditions to negotiate with the CGT: the actualization of the 
basic wages in the collective bargaining. Except the period 
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that goes from January to June 1986, in which increased, 
broadly speaking, the tendency for these wages was descendent. 
This explicit claim will appear in the general strike called 
on January 26, 1987. In the prior one, October 9, 1986, one of 
the main claims of the CGT was to equalize the wage system the 
state had established for the private sector with the wage 
system for the public sector (this wage system was connected 
to the first essay of collective bargaining that the trade 
unions and the industrial organizations realized in October 
1986). 
Another point to highlight, and connected with the prior 
one, is the situation of precarious job positions. This issue 
was one of the main points of disagreement between the state 
and the trade unions because the CGT pressured on the 
legalization of these job positions to be incorporated in the 
collective bargaining, while the state showed one of its most 
intransigent faces in this issue. During the eighties, the 
number of precarious job positions in the labor market 
composition increased. The increase of employment in urban 
areas between 1974 to 1988 was related to precarious job 
positions (Beccaria and Orsatti, 1991). According to Cariola 
(1992), the absence of certain features, typical of legal 
jobs, characterizes precarious jobs: stability guaranteed by 
collective bargaining and social benefits. Galin (1991) 
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includes within the group of precarious jobs to the illegal 
jobs, clandestine jobs, part-time jobs, and temporary jobs. 
Beccaria and Orsatti (1991) consider precarious jobs to the 
clandestine job or job not declared, taking into account the 
information obtained from the Household Permanent Survey. For 
the authors, this kind of jobs is associated to low payment, 
low job antiquity, unskilled positions, and lower number of 
work hours. 
Why was for the CGT important the legalization of these 
precarious job positions, and why was this claim at the heart 
of the wage conflict between trade unions and state? Because 
the rate of unionization was being affected. Argentinean rate 
of unionization, although is likely overestimated, is 
impressive for its magnitude (Torre 1972, Feldman 1987). It is 
measured with regards to the number of affiliates of the trade 
unions and the quantity of workers in conditions to join a 
union. It is directly related to the quantity of workers that 
the collective agreement covers. Galiani and Gerchunoff (2001) 
have showed that “union density rate in Britain and USA was 
thirty-nine and twenty-nine percent respectively in 1945; it 
was forty-four and twenty-five percent in 1955. USA union 
density peaked in 1945 while Britain's density peaked in 1980
with a rate of fifty-three percent. Argentina's rate seems to 
have been stabilized around forty-five percent until early 
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nineties when it decreased to around forty percent. Britain's 
rates also decreased since the early eighties and it was 
approximately forty percent by the early nineties. Britain and 
Argentina show similar union density rates since forties”. 
(pp. 11)
The CGT was concerned about the changes in the labor 
market composition – the increase of precarious jobs- and the 
consequences on the rate of unionization because it affected 
directly organized labor internal composition. The changes in 
the labor market composition provoked a decrease in the number 
of affiliates of the most representative trade unions (mainly 
industrial trade unions). As a result, the weight of 
industrial trade unions decreased while public trade unions 
(state trade unions and state public services trade unions) 
increased within organized labor. In sum, an uneven, 
fragmented labor market, with a high weight of informal 
sectors and an increase of precarious job positions 
considerable affected the rate of unionization. As a result, 
trade unions representativity and distribution of power within 
organized labor changed.
What is the conclusion of this story? Although the 
economic Plan Austral provoked an improvement in wages 
according to cost of living adjustment, by having established 
as one of the main points of the economic plan the freezing of 
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prices and wages, the CGT was not able to put in full practice 
one of its sources of growth and strength: collective 
bargaining. Furthermore, the CGT was not able to equalize the 
wages system for private and public sector, and was not able 
to legalize precarious job positions. These wage dimensions 
were closer to labor institutional configuration than to wage 
conditions of workers. Thus, the same basic problematic 
underlined the two main social claims of the period, wages and 
labor unions laws: the possibility to reorganize organized 
labor institutional configuration. 
The second stage was called social also because the 
pressure on the CGT executive committee from the regional 
trade unions, and the growing evolution of the number of 
strikes by economic sector polarized the tendencies within the 
CGT. During this stage, organized labor capacity to engage in 
dual relationships toward the state was enhanced (I want to 
remind the fact that in the prior stage, which was called 
corporatist, and in which organized labor unification took 
place, the different labor sectors shared to follow the path 
of confrontation toward the state). On the one hand, organized 
labor followed the path of confrontation toward the state 
through the calling of 6 general strikes. The main advocates 
of this path within organized labor were the regional trade 
unions, the state trade unions, the "25", and the 
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“ubaldinismo”. On the other hand, other labor sectors 
privileged the enhancement of the path of cooperation with the 
state because some of them, especially the industrial trade 
unions, had began to participate in a sort of collective 
bargaining with the agreement and under supervision of the 
state. Also because Alderete, a trade unions leader, had been 
appointed Ministry of Labor, what provoked controversial 
answers within the CGT, mainly from the “25” and the 
“ubaldinismo” since Alderete was part of the labor sector 
called “15”16. However, in spite of the differences among the 
labor sectors that compossed the CGT, organized labor 
coherence as a collective actor was prioritized since the 
polarized positions among labor sectors did not provoke 
organized labor (CGT) fragmentation. 
The labor unions laws that were at the heart of the 
dispute between organized labor and state during the eighties 
were the law that organizes the trade unions professional 
associations, the law that grants to trade unions the right to 
administrate the Health Insurance National System for workers 
and families, and the law that regulates the system of wage 
bargaining including minimum wage. The claim for the 
reinstatement of these labor unions laws was systematically 
16Although Alderete was appointed Ministry of Labor, the UCR offered this 
position, in first place, to Rodriguez and Triaca (one of the members of 
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raised throughout the six general strikes (and also during the 
prior stage). At the end of this stage, under the 
administration of the Ministry of Labor Alderete, a trade 
unions leader, began the full reinstatement of the labor 
unions laws, which began to function simultaneously at the 
beginning of 1988, under the administration of a new Minister 
of Labor, Tonelli (in the next stage). Only in the general 
strike that took place on April 14, 1988 (in the next stage) 
the CGT explicitly mentioned the labor unions laws because the 
industrial organizations had suggested to the president to 
veto the law of professional associations enacted by the 
Congress. Then, one of the main claims of the CGT in this 
strike was the opposition to any eventual presidential veto to 
the law of professional associations.  
Political party stage
Since the mid-term elections in which the peronist party 
acquired an overwhelming victory over the UCR (September 1987) 
until the end of 1988 (after the peronist party primaries in 
which the formula Menem/Duhalde was elected to run for the 
next presidential elections in 1989), five general strikes 
the CGT executive committee since organized labor unification), but both 
declined.  
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were called on: November 4, 1987; December 8, 1987; April 14, 
1988; September 9, 1988; and September 12, 1988.
In this stage, the state continued being the main subject 
of claims for the CGT, and likewise in the prior period 
(social stage) confrontation was placed also among labor 
sectors within the CGT. But this stage distinguished from the 
prior two by one particular reason: the inclusion of the 
peronist party. After the peronist party overwhelming victory 
in the mid-term elections of September 1987 the emptiness 
place of the party of opposition was filled by the peronist 
party, displacing the CGT and the trade unions leaders, which 
had filled this place since the beginning of the first 
democratic government. Indeed, it was particularly relevant 
the presence of the peronist party in the five general strikes 
and also in labor mobilizations. For example, in the general 
strike called on November 4, 1987, Carlos Menem (presidential 
pre-candidate) participated along with Ubaldini (CGT 
presider), who was the only speaker (although it was evident 
his absence in the two general strikes called on -- September 
9 and September 12, 1988 -- after his formula won the party 
primaries for presidential election). In turn Cafiero 
(presidential pre-candidate) supported all the general strikes 
in this stage as well as the Peronist Party National 
Conduction. Thus, the general strikes appeared as a space of 
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confrontation between the political party in the government 
(UCR) and the party of opposition (peronist party), as well as 
since the standpoint of organized labor, the general strikes 
were a space in which the main differences among labor sectors 
emerged with regards to how the CGT would participate in the 
new peronist party configuration (after the victory in the 
mid-term elections of September 1987, and the future party 
primaries to elect the presidential formula for the elections 
in 1989). 
Under these conditions, the third stage was called the 
political party stage because of: (1) the decrease of the 
weight of the labor side of the peronist party vis-à-vis the 
party side within the peronist party; (2) the constitution of 
the general strikes as a space of confrontation between labor 
and state, but also among labor sectors who strove to define 
CGT participation within the peronist party new institutional 
configuration; (3) the presence of the peronist party qua
political party in the general strikes; and (4) Organized 
labor claims around the reform of labor institutional 
configuration lost centrality because of the full 
reinstantment of the labor unions laws, which began under the 
administration of the trade unions leader, Alderete, as 
Ministry of Labor (in the prior stage), to finally begin to 
function simultaneously in this stage, at the beginning of 
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1988, under the administration of a new Minister of Labor, 
Tonelli.
The first main agreement between the UCR and the peronist 
party was possible to sign after the victory of the peronist 
party in the mid-term elections of 1987, when the PJ won the 
positions to governor all over the country, with the exception 
of two provinces in which the UCR won, Córdoba and Río Negro, 
and Neuquén, San Juán, and Corrientes, in which regional 
political parties won. In addition, the peronist party 
obtained the majority in the Chamber of Representatives, and 
maintained its supremacy in the Senate (until this election, 
the UCR maintained the majority in the Chamber of 
Representatives, and the peronist party in the Senate). The 
agreement between both parties was the Coparticipación Federal 
Law, which was enacted in February 1988, but it had been 
blocked in the Congress since 1985. The agreement between the 
peronist party and the UCR showed that the elections of 1987 
had provoked a turning point for the state (and the CGT) 
because the peronist party recovered its place as the party of 
opposition, and as a result, the labor side of the peronist 
party lost its place of state peronist privileged 
interlocutor. 
 As it was mentioned, one of the main historical events 
that affected the path of the first democratic government was 
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the defeat of the peronist party in the elections of 1983, in 
which the UCR obtained 7,725,823 votes (50 %) and the peronist 
party 5,994,405 (39 %). The unexpected victory of the UCR 
plunged the PJ into a virtual "political mourning". The 
peronist party went through a deep process of institutional 
reorganization and democratization. A new sector -- peronist 
renovation -- began to take form after the peronist party 
national meeting in Río Hondo (February 1985). This sector 
emerged in open confrontation against the orthodox side of the 
peronist party that had appointed in a vertical way the new 
authorities of the party in the Odeon Meeting, in December 
1984. After intense discussions between both sectors, it was 
called a third national party meeting with the presence of 
both sectors in La Pampa, in which the orthodox sector 
(Herminio Iglesias) in alliance with the labor sector "62" 
organizations imposed over the “peronist renovation". It was 
not until the end of 1985 that the peronist renovation began 
to win spaces within the peronist party, overall, because in 
the mid-term elections of 1985, the peronist party presented 
fractionated, and the candidates from the Frente Renovador
accomplished better electoral results than the candidates from 
the orthodox sector, FREJULI (for example, in the province of 
Buenos Aires, the former obtained more than one million votes, 
and the latter no more than half a million of votes). Finally, 
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the elections of 1987 consolidated the “Peronist Renovation” 
hegemony within the peronist party, until the party primaries 
in 1988, when the peronist renovation presidential formula, 
Cafiero and De La Sota, lost before the candidates Menem and 
Duhalde (Gutiérrez 2001, Lewitsky 1999). 
The peronist party new institutional configuration in 
this stage increased the divergences among labor sectors. The 
general strikes were exceptional witnesses of a situation in 
which the state continued being the subject of claims of the 
CGT but rather the peronist party was the CGT main 
interlocutor since some labor sectors in the CGT promoted to 
cooperate or confront toward the state considering how the 
peronist party, and the CGT inclusion in the party, could be 
affected. For example, although the first general strike 
(November 4, 1987) was supported by all the sectors of the 
CGT, during the first week of October organized labor was 
faced with an unusual situation. In the moment in which the 
economic situation and the inflation was at one of its most 
hard stages, 8 members of the CGT executive committee resigned 
due to the agreement between the "25" and the "ubaldinismo" to 
distribute labor positions in the future peronist party 
national meeting. With this action, the "15" and the "62" 
intended to pressure on the labor sectors but rather on 
Cafiero, the peronist renovation presidential candidate. Since 
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Argentinean organized labor does not sustain eternal ruptures, 
in the next meeting of the CGT, the members who had previously 
presented its resignation, returned to their positions (with 
the opposition of Lorenzo Miguel). As a result, the pressure 
from the "62" and the "15" on the alliance between the "25" 
and the “ubaldinismo” was not able to obstaculize the 
appointment of the trade union leaders Lingeri (ubalidinista) 
and García (25) in the peronist party national meeting. In the 
first meeting of the CGT after the "defeat" of the "62" before 
the alliance between the "25" and the ubaldinismo, the “62”, 
trying to recuperate capacity of action before the other labor 
sectors, proposed to call on a new general strike. The "25" 
and ubaldinistas proposed different meetings all over the 
country, instead of calling a general strike, in order to 
prevent the peronist party from being adversely affected. 
Ubaldini, acting as a mediator between the faced labor 
sectors, "25" and "62", was able to neutralize the "62" 
intentions by proposing to begin the general strike at 2 p.m., 
and under a holidays day (December 8, 1987). Finally, the 
third general strike called on April 14, 1988 unified again 
the CGT against the state socio-economic policies. This 
general strike showed also the main particularity of this 
stage, and it was the closeness between labor action with the 
peronist party. After the CGT decided to call on a new general 
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strike, the executive committee maintained a meeting with 
Cafiero in which they agreed on to join forces to guarantee 
the success of the strike. Thus, Cafiero, who was the
president of the peronist party national council, governor of 
the province of Buenos Aires, and presidential candidate 
(peronist renovation list) invited the population to 
participate in the general strike through the media, and 
pointed out that although it was not a wish to call on a 
general strike it was the only tool to express the economic 
policy has to be changed.
A new event would radically modify the relationships 
between the CGT and the peronist party. The peronist 
renovation to whom the CGT, especially the “25” and the 
“ubaldinismo”, had been associated, lost the peronist party 
primary elections in July 1988, in which the formula 
Menem/Duhalde won before the peronist renovation formula, 
Cafiero/De la Sota. The labor sectors that compossed the CGT
changed their relationship toward the peronist party, in turn 
this change affected the calling of the next two general 
strikes. One of the most eloquent features of the last two 
general strikes was the absence of the trade unions enrolled 
in the "62" and the "15". The absence revealed the debate 
among labor sectors around the new distribution of power 
within the new peronist party institutional configuration as 
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well as what form labor protest would adopt in the months 
previous to the presidential elections of May 1989. The 
general strike of September 9 was called as a result of the 
CGT decision of taking distance from the new economic plan 
called Primavera (Spring), and the CGT rejection to 
participate in the Wage National Council created by the state. 
However, many of the trade union leaders opposed to the 
calling of a new general strike, and preferred to replace it 
by another form of protest, like mobilizations all over the 
country. For example, although the "62" recognized the social 
necessity of a general strike, they did not want to 
obstaculize the peronist party path to the presidential 
elections of 1989. For them, the priority was to extend the 
success that Menem (to whom they were associated) had obtained 
in the party primaries over the peronist renovation into the 
CGT in order to subordinate to Ubaldini to the 62 
organizations. A new general strike, according to their 
political analysis, would favour the alliance between Ubaldini 
and the "25" within the CGT. The “62” did not declare in 
public this position, much less in a moment in which the 
prices and wages had the UCR in one of its worst moments of 
popularity. But they used a less visible tactic, which was to 
try to negotiate directly with the state. The "62" proposed to 
be offered to the CGT the two claims that had been previously 
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denied: a double increase in the minimum wage and in family 
assignations. The negotiations did not prosper and the general 
strike was called on. It was evident the absence of the "15" 
in the mobilization, and with the exception of Lorenzo Miguel 
and Genta, the "62" did not participate in the CGT stage, 
while was extended the presence of the "25" and the 
“ubaldinismo”. 
As a result of the police repression over the 
participants in the general strike (September 9), the CGT 
immediately called on another general strike on September 12, 
to reject the police repression and in defence of civil 
rights. The main opposition to the new general strike came 
from the "15", who did not participate of the deliberations in 
the CGT and criticized to the "25" and the “ubaldinismo” due 
to the nature of the strike, which not only affected the 
peronist candidate to the presidency (Menem) but also affected 
the trade unions since they would not be able to use the 
strike against the maximum of 10 % of increase in the basic 
wages of collective bargaining established by the state. The 
UOM (metal workers trade unions) and the "62" published a 
press release in the newspapers in which rejected the police 
repression against the pueblo, and expressed their support to 
the new general strike. The CGT criticized in public to those 
labor sectors that did not support the general strike and 
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pointed out that these trade union leaders will have to give 
explanations before the workers and the organic bodies of the 
CGT.
During the first two stages, organized labor through its 
mobilization constituted the state as its main subject of 
claims at the same time that shaped many of the main political 
arrangements with the state in the process of labor unions 
laws reform. But the historical conditions that brought the 
CGT until this point had changed in the last stage. On the one 
hand, the discussion between organized labor and state around 
labor institutional configuration began to lose centrality 
because the labor unions laws laws had been already enacted at 
the beginning of this stage. Although in the general strike 
that took place on April 14, 1988 the CGT made an explicit 
declaration with regards to the labor unions laws because the 
industrial organizations had suggested to the President 
Alfonsín to veto the law of professional associations enacted 
by the Congress. Thus, one of the main claims of the CGT in 
this strike was the opposition to any eventual presidential 
veto to the law of professional associations. 
On the other hand, the labor side of the peronist party 
was being gradually overshadowed vis-à-vis the party side. 
Even more, the peronist party new institutional configuration 
and political position exacerbated the differences among the 
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labor sectors within the CGT, and since these differences in 
certain moments became irresolvable, the way of finding an 
exit to the internal dispute within the CGT, as we have 
showed, was through the calling of a new general strike. 
Likewise it happened in the prior two stages, labor 
differences did not bring to CGT fragmentation, on the 
contrary, organized labor privileged its coherence as a 
collective actor. At the same time, labor continued engaging 
in dual relationships toward the state by cooperating or 
confronting, but in this stage labor field of action was 
conditioned by the appearance of a new actor: the peronist 
party. Thus, cooperation or confrontation toward the state was 
not merely related to the re-instatement of the labor unions 
laws but was connected to the insertion of organized labor in 




In the outset of the essay, the enigma, or historical 
puzzle, of the study was presented: How and why did organized 
labor (CGT) action hold a remarkable impact and create a 
significant political place for labor in the process of labor 
unions laws policy making that took place during the first 
democratic government that held in the power to former 
president Raúl Alfonsín (1983-1989), in a historical context 
characterized by labor institutional weakness and a non-pro 
labor party in the government?
In order to answer the question, we placed our attention 
on the historical and institutional patterns of overlapped and 
interwoven relationships that shaped labor politics in the 
eighties. We focused on labor calling of 13 general strikes 
with the aim of examining to what extent labor through its 
mobilization filled the emptiness place of 'the peronist party 
opposition qua political party', and shaped some of the main 
political arrangements with the state that have had a 
significant impact on the process of policy making and policy 
outcomes. More specifically, we focused on organized labor 
relationally constituted capacities, labor coherence as a 
collective actor and labor capacity to fit its demands toward 
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the state, the two critical dimensions of labor as a political 
actor to making sense of labor action vis-à-vis the state in 
the politics of labor unions laws reform. 
Beginning with the Thesis theoretical contribution within 
the field of policy making, this study built a bridge between 
the historical institutionalist literature on policy outcomes 
and Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field and pratice sense. 
Following Hall’s and Skocpol’s work, the process of labor 
unions laws policy making was analyzed through the lens of a 
polity-centered approach. Thus, the politics of labor unions 
laws reform in the eighties was shaped by conditional and 
contingent political factors as well as historical and 
institutional patterns of overlapped and interwoven 
relationships among state, peronist party, and labor. 
Bourdieu’s work enabled us to bring to the table a way of 
interpreting organized labor action vis-à-vis state in the 
process of labor unions laws reform through the lens of
organized labor relationally constituted capacities, or 
practice sense, which was, in certain way, obscured in the 
historical institutionalist tradition. Maintaining labor 
coherence as a collective actor and labor capacity to fit its 
demands toward the state, fostering with considerable freedom 
of action labor practices of cooperation and confrontation, or 
labor practices of inclusion and exclusion, within the field 
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of the politics of labor unions laws policy making, as it was 
described, were not given labor resources, or fixed and given 
labor attributes. On the contrary, both organized labor’s 
capacities were relationally constituted in the frame of 
multiple social relationships within which organized labor 
simultaneously act: with the state, the peronist party, the 
Congress, the industrial organizations, or among the labor 
sectors; and, of course, these were unstable, at times futile, 
relationships that varied and changed over time.
The richness and uniqueness of the historical puzzle and 
Argentina as case of study within the field of policy making 
lies in the two critical dimensions of labor as a political 
actor, or organized labor relationally constituted capacities, 
to making sense of labor action vis-à-vis the state in the 
process of labor unions laws policy making in the eighties: 
coherence as a collective actor and capacity to fit its 
demands toward the state. Because, precisely, through 
practices of inclusion or exclusion, or practices of 
cooperation or confrontation, organized labor suceeded in the 
field of the politics of labor unions laws policy making in 
light of the claims pursued and the policy outcomes. By 
privileging its coherence as a collective actor, organized 
labor maintained unified in a strong labor organization during 
the whole period, in spite of its internal heterogeneity. On 
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the other hand, labor capacity to fit its demands toward the 
state in the field of the politics of labor unions laws policy 
making and on policy outcomes was enhanced through the 
development of a dual relationship toward the state. 
Furthermore, the path of confrontation and the path of 
cooperation toward the state did not express the coordinated 
or uncoordinated action of different labor organizations at 
the same time that did not express organized labor action vis-
à-vis the state under different political regimes but were 
both present under the same historical period and with a 
strong and unified labor organization. 
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Appendix A
In this study, we used the following sources of data 
collection: 
 Argentinean scholar literature on labor politics.
• Labor unions laws reform proposals (three), from 1984 to 
1989. 
• CGT Press release, from 1984 to 1989.
• Journal El Bimestre, CISEA, from 1984 to 1988.
• Newspapers:
a) Clarín and La Nación (main national newspapers), from 
December 1983 to June 1989;
b) Labor Editorial, Clarín, every Monday from 1984 to 1989. 
Additionally, we took into consideration some variables 
to analyze labor market evolution in the eighties:
1. Rate of Unemployment.
2. Rate of Unionization, by sector of economy. 
3. Evolution of Real Wage.
4. Evolution of Wage, according to cost of living adjustment.
The analysis of the newspapers, or labor press release, 
among other sources, was not oriented to textual analysis. We 
consider these written pieces as a place in which the 
historical and symbolical relationships among actors can be 
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revealed. For doing so, it was taken a photography of the 
thirteen general strikes considering the following dimensions, 
and the significance of each dimension for each general 
strike: 
(1) Sphere of calling of the strike: Confederación 
General del Trabajo (CGT) executive committee, or a 
national assembly with regional trade unions by 
sector of economy: industry, bank, services, 
education, and public administration. 
(2) Number of strikers: the information will be 
collected by regions (considering the regions in 
which the country is divided), and by sectors of 
economy: industry, public administration, banks, 
services, and education. 
(3) Type of general strike: with mobilization or not, at 
the national and regional level. 
(4) Support from different social and political actors: 
industrial organizations, political parties, labor 
sectors. 
(5) General strikes main goals: political, economic, and 
social. 
(6) Relationship between general strikes and the 
evolution of strikes by economic sector (number of 
strikers, number of strikes, main goals).
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